Japanese banks are promising sources of capital class size/charter partition of the Japanese for developing countries wishing to finance a banking system. For each type of hidden capital balance of payments gap. Kane, Unal, and and each class of bank, the model develops Demirguc-Kunt show that Japanese banks are estimates of the stock market, interest rate, highly capitalized in terms of market value;
foreign exchange, and real estate sensitivities of much of their capital is "hidden capital," the returns to bank stockholders. divergence between accounting and stock market estimates.
Only the stock market sensitivities prove significant, at 5 percent. Time-series regressions Kane and associates developed a method for show that the large Japanese banks have develtesting hypotheses about two types of hidden oped stock market betas over two and that the capital: the misvaluation of on-balance-sheet value of the bank's beta has come to increase items (post-acquisition gains and losses that, with measures of its size and accounting leveralthough they remain unbooked, are bookable age. upon the sale of the item under Gencral Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) and Future research will investigate the sensitivintangible values that GAAP currently desigity of these results to different ways of pooling nates to be unbookable off-balance-sheet items.
data from individual banks and to more sophisticated methods for estimating various parameters. They construct a model that explains They also plan to extend the analysis by imbedchanges in both types of capital functions of ding it in a model of how variations in bankholding-period retums eamed in Japan on stocks, customer contracting arrangements in Japan bonds, yen, and real estate. They apply the affect the retums bank stockholders can cam. model to annual data for 1975-89 and a four- In recent years, Japanese banks have become major players in world finance.
Many apparently knowledgeable observers attrioute this development to the maintenance of inappropriately low capital requirements by Japanese authorities (Corrigan, 1987: Pettway, Kaneko, and Young, 1990) . However, Japanese banks are not undercapitalized. Their stocks show market capitalizations that average several times the vilue of the banks' accounting net worths (Kane, 1987; Baer and Mote, 1989) .
Since becoming major world financial institutions, Japanese banks have also become more important lenders to developing countries. Table 1 documents the magnitude of Japanese bank lending to developing countries. Japanese banks have consistently expanded their developing country lending and increased their individual country exposure in Latin America (Table 2) . Berteen 1987 and 1988, although other miajor countries decreased loans to the regionr's top four debtor countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela), Japanese banks added to their positions in these countries' debt.
For developing countries wishing to finance a balance-of-payment gap, Japanese banks are promising sources. This paper studies the capital positions of Japanese banks to understand be..er the growth in market capicalization that underlies these banks' ability to vithstand the risks of developing-countrv 2 lending.
A second block of the model endogenizes changes in k and U as functions of ex post holding period returns on stocks, bonds, yen, and Japanese real estate. This formulation permits us not only to test hypotheses about the determinants of both forms of hidden capital, but to use the model to explain variation in the me.rket, interest, foreign-exchange, and real-estate sensitivities of an institution's stock.
The analysis extracts market, interest-rate, foreign-exchange, and real-estate sensitivities from a time series of cross-section regressions that use accounting and rate-of-return information to explain the market value of stockholder equity claims. The f'rst block of the model is estimated for each of the 15 years 1975-1989 for four categories of Japanese banks. The four-class partition of the banking system represents a conventional Japanese classification that uses the names city banks, longterm credit banks, trust banks, and regional banks. This classification closely approximates a size-based partition, with city banks having the largest average asset size and regional banks the smallest average asset size throughout the period we study.
II. Model and Diagaostic Checks
The SMVAM is estimated separately at each date for members of each class of institution:
MV and BV denote the market and book value of firm equity. U is interpreted as the market value of unbookable equity, while k is the valuation ratio that serves to adjust the value of bookable items to market. These coefficients measure the de facto deceptiveness of the Japanese accounting system. Unless both U -0 and k -1, the accounting or book value of a bank's capital represents a biased estimate of the market value of stockholder equity. If the estimated intercept is significantly positive (negative), unbookable assets and liabilities serve as a net hidden source of (drain on) institutional capital.
Equation (1) 
-k ~k k kt ok'tL't Vt 3 kt -kt.l -00 + 0m RMt + 0rRt + OkfFt + pkRLt + w t'(3) Rmt Rt, RFt' and RLt represent holding-period returns on a stock-market index, a bond index, dollar investments in yen, and Japanese real estate, respectively. We include RFt and R½t to test the often-heard conjecture that Japanese bank stock has benefited greatly from appreciation in the yen and in Japanese real estate. The vt and wt are stochastic error terms The slope coefficients measure the market, interest-rate, foreign-exchange, and realestate sensitivity of SMVAM's parameters.
Equations (2) and (3) are offered as flexible functional forms that parameterize in an interpretable and parsimonious way revaluations that asset markets make continually. Results to be developed in later sections of this paper indicate that movements in Ut and k are explained predominantly by the first influence (stock returns), with the other vaLiables having no significant effects. The Japanese stock-market index proves significant for every class of bank. This is consistent with a further finding that Japanese banks have come to own over 40 percent of the universe of Japanese corporate stocks. This makes investment in these banks' stock shares in large part a leveraged investment in the Japanese stock market as a whole.
To furnish a complementary perspective, we also estimate a traditional multi-ind.-: market model. Using this model, stock-market betas for large Japanese banks are shown to surge sharply upward after 1983.
III. Data and Sam'le Characteristics
The data set includes market and book values for the capital and total assets of every Japanese bank in existence during the 1975-1989 sample period. For regional ban!s, the sample size varies over the sample period, Chart 1 reports ratios of the book value of stockholder equity to t,tal assets. Although these ratios are mvch lower than those reported by comparable U.S. banks, these banks cannot reasonably be characterized as lacking in capital. Chart 2 clarifies that over the sample period a high and rising ratio of mean market value to book value obtained for city bank-, long-term credit banks, trust banks and regional banks.
These charts indicate that hidden capital expands greatly during the late 1980s. The MV/BV ratio first exceeds 2 for city banks and long-term credit banks in 1982 and for trust banks in 1984. Tte ratio continues to increase until 1987, when it peaks for the first three classes, at 8.9, 10.6, and 11.8, respectively. From these respective peaks, MV/BV declines to 5.8, 7.5 and 4.9 by 1989.
Compared to the other three classes, regional banks show a lower and less-volatile MV/BV ratio. The ratio does not exceed two until 1986, peaks at 3.28 two years later, and declines to 2.96 in 1989.
The indices needed to estimate equations (2) and (3) have to be approximated. Although data on dividend yields are lacking, Japanese dividend rates are reputed to be low and relatively stable. This makes it reasonable to approximate the holding-period return on a stock by its annual rate of price appreciation. To test the U -0 and k -1 hypothesis of "fully informative accounting values" for each class separately, we focus on the time series of coefficient deviations from the hypothesized values. We turn now to the revaluation equations (2) Fitting a multi-index market model (MIMM) provides a straightforward way to check this. The version of MIMM that we fit expands the basic market model by adding bond returns, real-estate returns, and returns on dollar investments in yen. We include returns on yen and real-estate even though they prove insignificant in Tables 4 and 5 because we want to allow for the possibility that effects operating through U and k might cumulate to significance. The MIMM stochastic return-generating process specifies that the return Rp on portfolio p is:
In (4), MP' rp' 6fp, and OLp measure the portfolio's systematic market, interest-rate, foreign-exchange and real-estate risk.
We construct Rpt as an equal-weighted portfolio of returns for every bank in each class. For each class, Table 6 reports The striking feature of the various runs is the sky-high level of market risk toward which the average member of the first three bank size classes evolved. These betas range from 2 to 3, which is two to three cimes the magnitude of the estimates both for regional Japanese banks and of parallel estimates for large U.S. banks obtained by Unal and Kane (1988) with quarterly 1975.1985 data. These high betas confirm the hypothesis that, when a leveraged institution has a large diversified position in the stock market, its market capitalization moves by a multiple of the price movements observed for the market as a whole.
In the Japanese stock-market decline of the first quarter of 1990, the prices of the high-beta bank stocks fell more rapidly than the overall Japanese market index. This has important implications for policymakers. The capital position of banks that invest heavily in corporate stock is more volatile than the stock market itself. The market capitalization of highbeta bank stocks can decline suddenly and markedly. In a world where governments insure de facto all of the debts of large domestic banks, this volatility implies that, to protect Japanese taxpayers, risk-based marketvalue capital requirements should be designed to increase with the size of each bank's market beta.
Individual-Bank Runs. To investigate within-class variation in market betas, Table 7 reports the results of estimating the one-index version of equation (4) for the individual banks in each class for which we have data for all 15 years. Although we do not report results for the four-index model, R, RL, and Rf prove significant in time-series runs for only few of these banks.
The market betas found for most members of each of the three largest size classes prove to be of the same order of magnitude as in the pooled run. The 24 regional banks that show significant market betas appear to follow portfolio strategies that are more similar to those followed by larger institutions than to those pursued by fellow members of their charter class.
When we allow for a possible structural shift in individual market betas after 1983, high market betas develop only during the later subsample.
A visual inspection of the data reveals that high betas are typically driven by 1985, 1987 and 1988 observations. In these years, the market capitalizations of institutions show extraordinary increases relative to the market. These beta estimates are much higher than those reported by Pettway, Tapley and Yamada (1988) . Pettway, Tapley and Yamada cover different sample years (1982-1983 and 1984-1986 ) and use daily data. Neglecting data from 1987-89 would tend to lower our beta estimates substantially. To some degree, these authors' lower betas may also reflect downward bias due to employing daily data on stocks that fail to trade daily.
Tracking Variation in Market Betas at Individual Banks. Pettway, Sicherman, and Yamada (1990) contrast an observed tendency for market betas of Japanese corporations to increase with size against the stylized tendency for market betas to decline with size for U.S. firms (Reinganum, 1981; Chang and Prinegar, 1989) . These authors attribute this differential behavior to presumed differences in management objectives at U.S. and Japanese corporations. While U.S. corporations' internal diversification is believed to increase with size, in Japan agency costs associated lender influence on decisions by corporate managers are held to rise with size. Agency costs in Japanese banking relationships are studied by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1989) . 
VI.Opportunities for Future Research
Although the ordinary-least-squares estimates reported in this paper seem reliable enough to support qualitative inferences, more sophisticated econometric procedures may be able to establish a role for bond, land, or foreign-exchange returns. In future research, we plan to use seemingly unreated regression, crossed regression, nonlinear formulations, simultaneous-equation models, and heteroskedasticity adjustments. We also plan to use covariance analysis to disaggregate regional banks into highbeta and low-beta groups and to test whether SMVAM equations for banks with similar betas can be pooled across charter types.
We further plan to analyze contracting arrangements inherent in Japanese financial institutions and markets. The goal of this investigation is to help us to sort out how contracting arrangements between and among banks and related and unrelated corporations affect the size and distribution of agency costs in Japan. FOOTNOTES 1. This figure is lower after the recent decline of the Japanese stock market.
2. More recently there has been an overall decrease in commercial bank exposure to developing countries. Nevertheless, Japanese ban k exposures still remain one of the highest among creditor countries.
3. Support for the timing of this sample partition may also be found in regulatory events. Pettway, Tarpley, and Yamada (1988) associate a post-1983 expansion of bank risk-taking with a reduction in administrative guidance, while Cargill and Royama (1988) note an acceleration in money-market development.
4. Experiments not reported here allow each of Rfp and RLP to be the second index and confirm the usefulness of going on to allow for structural shifts in (2) and (3) 0% 1975 1977 1979 1981 19B3 1985 1987 1989 Lii CITY -LONG-TERM TRUST REGIONAL 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 CITY LONG-TERM CREDIT TRUST REGIONAL 3. Except for regional banks, the two-index model has the highest adjusted R2 of all possible 2 combinations.
For regional banks, the third equation listed has the highest adjusted R 
